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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, transferred from the Utah Supreme 
Court, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: Whether Bob Miles ("Miles") was acting in the course and scope of his 
employment for Byer Excavating, Inc. (such that Byer may be held vicariously liable for 
Miles's alleged conduct) where Miles left his work assigned by Byer Excavating on Lot 
174 to assist Lowell Construction with its operation on a different project on Lot 173. 
Issue 2: Whether Miles's course and scope of employment can be inferred to 
include apparent authority to leave his duties assigned by Byer on Lot 174 and become 
part of Lowell Construction's operations in unloading rebar on Lowell's project on Lot 
173 absent any act or conduct of Byer indicating such apparent authority. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. 
Francisconi v. Union Pacific Railroad, 36 P.3d 999, 1001-02 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Byer Excavating, finding that it could 
not be held vicariously liable for Bob Miles's acts because, as a matter of law, Bob Miles 
was acting outside of the course and scope of his employment. Summary judgment is 
appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary 
judgment is not precluded merely because some facts may be disputed, but only when 
1 
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there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 
1390 (Utah 1980). Reasonable inferences regarding facts are viewed in a light favorable 
to the nonmoving party but the Court is not required to draw unreasonable inferences that 
are not supported by the facts. Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, 
f37; 10 P.3d 338. The Court is not required to ignore reasonable inferences favorable to 
the moving party, based on uncontested facts. Id. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)G): 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals over: . . . 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c): 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda 
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff E.J. Sutton brought this suit against Byer Excavating, Inc. ("Byer 
Excavating" or "Byer"), Lowell Construction Company ("Lowell Construction" or 
2 
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"Lowell"), and James H. Diamond Concrete to recover for injuries sustained during 
Lowell Construction's operations of unloading a load of rebar for its Project on Lot 173. 
Byer Excavating's trackhoe operator had left his work for Byer on the separate project on 
Lot 174 to assist in Lowell's operations on Lot 173. Sutton was injured when he ran 
toward the unstable load of rebar he had rigged and suspended from the trackhoe bucket 
and the load fell and struck Sutton. Byer defended on the basis that Miles was not 
negligent, that the accident was primarily caused by Sutton's.own negligence, and that 
any alleged conduct of Miles was outside the course and scope of Miles's employment 
with Byer. 
Sutton settled with Lowell Construction and Diamond Concrete. Byer Excavating 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that at the time of the accident Bob Miles 
was not within the course and scope of his employment for Byer. The trial court granted 
Byer's motion and entered an order dismissing Sutton's claims against Byer on 
September 27, 2010. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sutton's Injury in Lowell Construction's Operations on Lot 173 
This case arises out of a construction site injury which occurred August 1, 2007, 
on Lot 173 at the Colonies Subdivision in Park City, Utah. (R. 3.) Appellant E. J. Sutton 
("Sutton") was injured in the course of Lowell Construction's operation of unloading 
rebar delivered for Lowell Construction's construction project on Lot 173. Lowell 
Construction was the general contractor in charge of the work on Lot 173. (R. 788.) 
3 
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1 
Don Jones ("Jones") was Lowell Construction's superintendent on Lot 173. (R. 
641.) Jones confirms that Lowell "was in charge of the unloading operation as opposed 
to.. .anybody else" and that "Byer Excavating had absolutely no involvement with the 
Thorpe residence project on Lot 173." (R. 786-89.) Sutton admits Lowell was in charge 
of its rebar unloading. (R. 814.) Sutton's expert, Don Rigtrup, testified that Lowell was 
in charge of, in control of, and had the final say regarding, Lowell's rebar unloading 
operation. (R. 817-20.) 
Byer Excavating's Work on Lot 174 
Byer was an earthwork subcontractor performing clearing, grubbing and 
excavation work for M.H. Allred, the general contractor on the separate and unrelated 
project located on Lot 174. (R. 3, 741, 766-67.) Byer Excavating had no work, 
operations, contract or other involvement on Lot 173. (R. 595-96, 741-42, 767.) There 
was no agreement between Byer and Lowell. (R. 787.) Jones never had any 
conversations with anyone at Byer. (R. 786.) Indeed, Jones did not even know who Byer 
was. (R. 786.) 
Bob Miles was employed by Byer to operate a trackhoe to excavate Lot 174 and 
clear trees and debris. (R. 797.) 
August 1, 2007 Accident on Lot 173 
On August 1, 2007, the date of the accident, a load of rebar ordered by Lowell 
Construction was delivered to Lot 173. (R. 784-85.) Lowell needed to unload the rebar 
from the delivery truck on Lot 173. (R. 785.) 
4 
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On the day of the accident, E.J. Sutton was working as a framing superintendent 
for R.W. Construction, which was also a subcontractor for M.H. Allred Construction on 
4 
the construction project on Lot 174. (R. 3, 685.) R.W. Construction had no agreement 
with Lowell regarding the project on Lot 173. (R. 784-85.) 
Lowell Construction's superintendent, Jones, asked Sutton to ask the trackhoe 
operator to help off-load Lowell's rebar on Lot 173. (R. 603.) Sutton acknowledged that 
Lowell's request to help unload its rebar on Lot 173 was outside the scope of work he 
was hired to do on Lot 174. (R. 810.) 
As Miles was performing his work for Byer on Lot 174, Sutton approached him 
and asked him to take the trackhoe to Lot 173 and assist Lowell Construction in 
unloading its rebar. (R. 602-03, 805.) Miles responded "no, I don't want to do that, but I 
will." (R. 799.) Miles testified regarding his reluctance to assist Lowell that "Ishouldn't 
be doing that because that's not what I'm paid to be doing." (R. 801.) Miles also 
testified that he did not want to go help Lowell on Lot 173 "because I didn 't think that's 
where I should be. I should have been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800.) 
Sutton also understood Miles's reluctance to become part of Lowell's operations 
on Lot 173 was because "he was, you know, kind of busy doing what he did.. .kind of 
having to stop and go do something for somebody else...." (R. 809.) Sutton 
acknowledged that Lowell's request to help unload its rebar on Lot 173 was outside the 
scope of work he was hired to do on Lot 174. (R. 810.) 
5 
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Bob Miles left his work for Byer on Lot 174 and took the trackhoe to Lot 173, 
where he became part of Lowell Construction's operation in unloading Lowell 
Construction's rebar. (R. 3, 791.) Jones understood that in doing so, Miles would be 
leaving his work on Lot 174 and would become part of Lowell Construction's operation 
in unloading the rebar. Jones testified "that goes without saying, to be able to help me 
they would have had to stop their operation.. .In helping me, they became part of my 
operation." (R. 791.) Byer had no work to do at the location where the trackhoe was 
located during the rebar unloading and there was no reason for Bob Miles to be at that 
location in his employment for Byer. (R. 747-48, 773-74.) 
Byer was not aware that Bob Miles had left Lot 174 and taken the trackhoe to Lot 
173 to assist Lowell Construction until after the accident occurred. Byer was not 
authorized and did not retain any right to supervise Bob Miles regarding activities on Lot 
173. (R. 582, 586, 589, 592, 596-97.) 
During Lowell's rebar unloading on Lot 173, E.J. Sutton was injured when he 
went near the suspended load of rebar which he had rigged to the trackhoe. (R. 617.) 
When the load became unstable and began to tilt, Sutton ran next to the load rather than 
stay away and clear of the unstable load. Although asked twice by the rebar delivery 
truck driver if Sutton was going to lower the load to the ground before going near it, 
Sutton declined and decided to go near the suspended load without lowering it to the 
ground. (R. 616, 621.) 
6 
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Bob Miles's Employment with Byer Excavating; Nature of Responsibilities 
Bob Miles's employment with Byer was limited to earthwork and did not include 
unloading rebar or other materials with the trackhoe. (Rf 583-85, 589-90, 595-96.) Miles 
has never been involved with rigging, hoisting or unloading rebar as part of his 
employment with Byer. (R. 590.) 
Miles was not hired or paid to leave Byer's work and use Byer's equipment to 
assist another contractor on another separate project where Byer has not contracted to 
work. (R. 583-84, 589-90, 595-96, 747, 758-59, 773-74.) 
Bob Miles was not authorized to use Byer's trackhoe other than in furthering the 
scope of Byer's excavation and earthwork on Lot 174. Bob Miles was not authorized to 
use the trackhoe to perform any assistance or activity on Lot 173. (R. 583-85, 589-92, 
595-97.) 
Byer has two licenses and divisions, (1) its excavation and grading operations 
which performs work under the S310 Excavation and Grading license and (2) its utility 
crews which perform work under its S3 90 Sewer and Waste Water Pipeline license.1 (R. 
775.) Byer employs a number of different employees in these two divisions with 
different job descriptions to perform a variety of different tasks and activities. (R. 775). 
1
 Byer does not have an S260 - General Concrete Contractor license which involves 
"placing and erection of steel bars for reinforcing." (R. 584.) Unloading rebar and 
materials on Lot 173 was outside the scope of Byer's excavation and grading business 
and the scope of Byer's S310 contractor's license. (R. 768.) Byer's earthwork business 
under its S310 contractor's license does not involve handling or unloading rebar or other 
materials with trackhoes or cranes. (R. 768.) 
7 
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Bob Miles was hired to perform excavation and grading work. (R. 748, 775, 758. 
768) Bob Miles's employment with Byer does not include Byer's utility work which 
sometimes involves movement of pipe and materials for that work. (R. 748, 775.) This 
work is performed by different work crews with different equipment and different scope 
of employment responsibilities from what is involved in Bob Miles's excavation work. 
(R. 775.) Bob Miles's scope of employment does not include the construction of sewer 
and utility lines. (R. 748, 775.) 
Sutton asserts that other Byer employees, in Byer's utility crews, use excavation 
equipment to unload materials on other projects. None of the activities alleged by Sutton 
involved Bob Miles. (R. 749-50, 776-79.) These activities are performed by utility crews 
and not by Bob Miles. Bob Miles's scope of employment with Byer is limited to 
excavation and grading work. (R. 583-84, 589-90, 595-96, 748, 775, 758.) Whenever 
Bob Miles was involved with a sewer and utility project, his work was limited to the 
excavation and grading work on those projects. (R. 775.) The Byer utility work crews 
would then come to the project to perform the utility and pipe work. Bob Miles did not 
participate in the utility and pipe work on these projects. (R. 749, 759, 776-77.) 
The activities asserted by Sutton regarding movement of pipe and other utility 
materials involved Byer's underground utility crews and are unrelated to Bob Miles's 
employment in Byer's excavation work. (R. 776.) The utility work involves different 
types of crews and equipment than Bob Miles's excavation and grading work. For 
example, the utility work crews include a machine operator and at least one or two other 
8 
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persons to assist with the pipe and utility work. The utility crews are equipped with 
rigging equipment for use in working with the pipes and utility materials. (R. 748,776, 
758.) In contrast, Bob Miles typically worked alone and was not equipped with rigging 
equipment because he was not hired to engage in any activity that would involve 
unloading pipe or other materials. (R. 748, 776.) Bob Miles's employment with Byer 
was limited to earthwork and did not include unloading rebar or other materials with the 
trackhoe. (R. 741-42, 767-68, 595-96.) 
Hours and Spatial Boundaries of Miles's Employment with Byer 
Hours of Employment with Byer 
Bob Miles knew that assisting Lowell unload its rebar was not time for which he 
would be paid by Byer. (R. 801.) Bob Miles did not submit time to Byer for payment for 
the time he spent taking the trackhoe to Lot 173 to assist Lowell in unloading the rebar. 
(R. 590-91, 595.) Byer did not pay Bob Miles for the time in taking the trackhoe to Lot 
173 and helping Lowell Construction unload the rebar. (R. 590-91, 595.) 
Bob Miles day working for Byer on August 1, 2007 began at about 7:30 a.m. He 
helped load the trackhoe and transport Byer's trackhoe to Lot 174. This took about three 
hours. Miles then began the earthwork and grading work on Lot 174 and worked on this 
for about two hours until he left Lot 174 to assist Lowell Construction unload the rebar. 
Bob Miles submitted only five hours of time (approximately 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.) to 
Byer for payment on August 1, 2007. None of this time represented time assisting Lowell 
Construction unload its rebar. (R. 590-91, 595.) 
9 
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Spatial Boundaries of Miles's Employment with Byer 
Any activities by Bob Miles on Lot 173 were outside the ordinary spatial 
boundaries of Bob Miles's employment with Byer. (R. 585, 591-92, 596.) Byer had no 
work to do at the location where the trackhoe was located during the rebar unloading and 
there was no reason for Bob Miles to be at that location in his employment for Byer. (R. 
747-48, 774.) 
Sutton admits in his Complaint that the rebar was unloaded uto Lot #173." (R. 3-
4.) Sutton was injured on Lot 173. (R. 783.) Bob Miles left the location of Byer's work 
on Lot 174 and went to the physical location of Lowell's operation and became part of 
Lowell's operation in unloading the rebar onto Lot 173. (R. 791.) Sutton testified that 
this location was "up the hill from us, probably 50 to 100 yards..." from where Miles was 
working. (R. 805.) With respect to the location of Lowell's rebar unloading operation, 
Miles testified that he did not want to go help Lowell there "because I didn yt think that's 
where I should be. I should have been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800.) 
Sutton raises the issue of whether the tracks of the trackhoe actually left Lot 174. 
Sutton relies upon Don Jones's hand drawing in his deposition. Mr. Jones testified that 
his drawing was a "rough estimate" and "inaccurate." (R. 784.) Regardless of whether 
the track portion of the trackhoe was technically on Lot 174 or 173, Sutton admits that the 
trackhoe was physically situated so the boom of the trackhoe could swing over Lot 173 
and place the rebar on Lot 173. (R. 642-44, 783.) Byer had no work to do at the location 
10 
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where the trackhoe was located during the rebar unloading and there was no reason for 
Bob Miles to be at that location in his employment for Byer. (R. 747-48, 774.) 
Byer's Interests Were Not Furthered by Lowell Construction's Rebar Unloading 
There is no evidence that Miles was motivated by any Byer interest to assist 
Lowell in unloading its rebar on Lot 173. To the contrary, Miles testified "Ishouldn't be 
doing that because that's not what I'm paid to be doing" and " / didn 't think that's 
where I should be. I should have been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800). 
Byer did not benefit in any fashion from the unloading of the rebar or from any of 
the activities relating to unloading the rebar on Lot 173. (R. 583-85, 589-92, 595-97.) 
More importantly, Bob Miles could not imagine any interest of Byer that was served by 
unloading Lowell Construction's rebar. (R. 590.) 
Sutton's expert, Don Rigtrup, was unable to identify any specific benefit to Byer 
regarding the unloading of Lowell's rebar. (R. 821-28.) With respect to a benefit to Byer 
from unloading Lowell's rebar, Mr. Rigtrup admits that he is "just speculating." (R. 822.) 
Sutton suggests without any factual basis that Lowell's porta-potty may have been a 
benefit to Byer. Byer and Miles, however, were unaware of Lowell's porta-potty as of the 
date of the accident. (R. 750, 780.) 
Don Jones of Lowell Construction confirmed that "the unloading of the steel did 
not benefit, in any way, Byer Excavating " and that what Miles "was doing in assisting 
with unloading the rebar was purely for the benefit of Lowell Construction." (R. 787.) 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
Sutton also testified that the activities on Lot 173 to move the rebar did not confer 
any benefit to the work that was to be performed on Lot 174. (R. 813.) Byer did not 
benefit in any fashion from the unloading of the rebar or from any of the activities 
relating to unloading the rebar on Lot 173. (R. 583-85, 589-92, 595-97.) 
Alleged Industry Custom to Help Other Contractors and Informal Bartering System 
In his 30 or so years of experience in the excavation business, 17 of which were 
with Byer Excavating, Bob Miles had never been asked to leave his jobsite to help out on 
another jobsite. (R. 589, 797-98.) 
Sutton asserts that Miles acknowledged that contractors on projects help each other 
"from time to time." This statement was not in the context of his specific employment 
with Byer. (R. 802.) In his decades of construction employment, Lowell's request to 
assist unload its rebar was the first time he had been asked to assist on another 
contractor's project. (R. 590, 797-98.) Bob Miles testified: 
Q: Okay. Have you ever worked, in your 30-some years, on job sites where 
another contractor or entity asked you to help out with their jobs ? Has that 
ever happened to you ? 
A. Not that I can remember. 
Q. This is the first time you were asked to assist on another contractor's 
project ? 
A. (Witness nods head up and down.) 
Q. Okay. 
MR. HANSEN: He was nodding his head. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. 
(R. 797-98.) 
12 
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Sutton asserts various instances from separate and unrelated instances of Byer 
assisting other contractors. However, none of these instances involved any assistance to 
other contractors on separate projects where Byer had not contracted to perform work. 
None of the instances asserted by Sutton involved Bob Miles. (R. 748-50, 786-90.) 
There is no evidence of any instance where Byer authorized Miles to leave Byer's work to 
use Byer's equipment on another unrelated project where Byer was not working. (R. 797-
98.) Bob Miles left Byer's work on Lot 174 and became part of Lowell's operation in 
unloading the rebar onto Lot 173. (R. 791.) There is no evidence that Byer authorized 
this. (R. 747, 773.) 
Sutton relies upon deposition testimony of its expert, Don Rigtrup, for the 
proposition that sharing equipment and exchanging favors is commonplace on 
construction sites. Sutton alleges the existence of an "industry standard barter system." 
However, Mr. Rigtrup testified that he is not familiar with the actual operations or 
practices of Byer. (R. 822, 828.) There was no agreement between Byer and Lowell. (R. 
787.) Jones never had any conversations with anyone at Byer. (R. 786.) Indeed, Jones 
did not even know who Byer was. (R. 786.) 
No Apparent Authority to Work on Lot 173 
Sutton asserts that Miles had "apparent authority" to perform the unloading work 
as part of Lowell's operations on Lot 173 because "Sutton presumed that Miles had 
authority." Sutton offers no evidence of any Byer conduct indicating that Miles was 
authorized to stop Byer's work on Lot 174 and, on behalf of Byer, become part of Lowell 
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Construction's operations in unloading rebar on Lot 173. 
Sutton relies on Miles's testimony that he was not "instructed by anybody at Byer 
Excavating to call them and run any problems by them, any concerns that you have on the 
site." (R. 801.) There is no testimony of Miles, and no evidence of any kind, that Miles 
thought he had authority to use Byer's trackhoe in Lowell's operations regarding the Lot 
173 project. There is no evidence that Miles was authorized to represent Byer or do 
anything on behalf of Byer in Lowell's operations and activities on the unrelated project 
on Lot 173. Miles was never authorized to enter into any agreements on behalf of Byer. 
(R. 747.) 
Miles's undisputed testimony on this point is that "Ishouldn't be doing that 
because that's not what I'm paid to be doing." (R. 801.) Miles also testified that he did 
not want to go help Lowell on Lot 173 "because I didn't think that's where I should be. 
I should have been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800.) 
Bob Miles was not authorized to use the Byer Excavating trackhoe on a jobsite 
other than the one where he was employed to work. (R. 582-82, 589-90, 747.) Sutton 
acknowledged that Lowell's request to help unload its rebar on Lot 173 was outside the 
scope of work he was hired to do on Lot 174. (R. 810.) Bob Miles knew that helping 
someone else on a different job site was outside the scope of his employment with Byer 
Excavating. (R. 589-91, 800.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The salient issue on appeal is whether Byer Excavating can be held liable for Bob 
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Miles's involvement in the accident where Miles left his work for Byer on Lot 174 and 
became part of Lowell Construction's operations to unload rebar onto Lot 173. Summary 
judgment on this issue is proper "when the employee's activity is so clearly . . . outside 
the scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot differ." Newman v. White Water 
Whirpool, 197 P.3d 654, 658 (Utah 2008). It is difficult to conceive any reasonable 
theory how Miles's scope of employment could be expanded to include abandoning his 
work for Byer and leaving that work to become part of another contractor's operation 
with whom Byer had no relationship on a project with which Byer had no involvement. 
To hold Byer Excavating vicariously liable for Miles's acts, Sutton must show that, 
at the time of the accident, there was a respondeat superior relationship between Byer and 
Miles, and that Miles was operating within the course and scope of his employment. At 
the time of the accident, Byer Excavating had no control over the details of Miles's work 
for Lowell Construction on lot 173, and thus respondeat superior relationship with Bob 
Miles. Miles also was not acting within the course and scope of his employment because 
he was not doing the general work he was hired to do, was outside the time and ordinary 
spatial boundaries of his employment, and was not motivated by Byer's interests. At the 
time of the accident, Bob Miles was part of Lowell Construction's operation and was 
under the control of Lowell Construction and its superintendant, Don Jones. (R. 791.) 
Bob Miles was employed by Byer Excavating to perform excavation and grading 
work on Lot 174, and that at the time of the accident, Bob Miles was doing a task at a 
jobsite for another contractor that all had no relation to the excavation and grading he was 
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to perform on Lot 174 for Byer. Bob Miles's employment with Byer did not include 
unloading rebar or other materials from delivery trucks, and certainly did not involve 
helping other contractors on unrelated projects. Lowell's request to assist with the rebar 
unloading was the first time in Miles's 17 years of employment for Byer that he had been 
asked to stop his work and assist another contractor on another project. He knew that he 
should not have been helping Lowell because that was not what he was paid to do. 
Bob Miles had no apparent authority from Byer to do anything on behalf of Byer, 
as an employee, agent or otherwise, with respect to Lowell Construction or Lot 173. More 
specifically, there was no conduct on Byer's part giving rise to such authority. He was 
not hired or authorized to use Byer's equipment on projects where Byer was not under 
contract to work, and he was not hired to use Byer's equipment to unload materials. He 
was hired to clear debris on and excavate Lot 174. 
Bob Miles's acts were so clearly outside of the scope of his employment that no 
reasonable juror could find otherwise, and summary judgment should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
When Bob Miles was assisting Lowell Construction unload its rebar on Lot 
173, he was not where Byer Excavating hired him to be, and was not doing what Byer 
hired him to do on Lot 174. At the time of the accident, he was part of Lowell 
Construction's operation, and under Lowell's control. Miles testified "I shouldn't be 
doing that because that's not what I'm paid to be doing," and "I didn't think that's where 
I should be, I should have been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 670, 800-801). 
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Sutton acknowledged that Lowell's request to help unload its rebar on Lot 173 was 
outside the scope of work he was hired to do on Lot 174. (R. 810.) Because Lowell, not 
Byer, controlled the details of Miles's work unloading the rebar, and because unloading 
rebar for an unrelated contractor on an unrelated project was outside the scope of Miles5s 
employment, Byer Excavating cannot be held vicariously liable. 
I. BYER EXCAVATING CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
BOB MILES'S ACTS WHERE, AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, 
BYER HAD NO RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR RELATIONSHIP WITH 
MILES AND BECAUSE MILES WAS ACTING OUTSIDE OF THE 
COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
Byer Excavating can only be held liable for alleged conduct of Miles if Sutton 
establishes that at the time of the accident, (1) a respondeat superior or employment 
relationship existed between Miles and Byer and (2) that Miles's conduct was in the 
course and scope of such employment relationship with Byer.2 Glover by & Through 
Dyson v. BSA, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385-1386 (Utah 1996). These essential elements are not 
present. 
The undisputed facts show that no respondeat superior relationship existed 
between Byer Excavating and Miles at the time of the accident because Miles, by 
abandoning his work to go help Lowell Construction, had become part of Lowell's 
operation, subject to Lowell's control. (R. 788, 791, 814, 817-820) 
2
 The trial court did not expressly address the issue of whether a respondeat superior 
relationship existed between Byer and Miles at the time of the accident. However, this 
issue was fully briefed, and this Court may affirm on any ground that the trial court could 
have relied on. Afridi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 UT 53, f 5, 122 P.3d 596. 
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Further, Miles was clearly outside the course and scope of his employment to 
perform excavation and grading on Lot 174. The rebar unloading for Lowell 
Construction was not excavation and grading work, was not part of the job tasks Byer 
assigned him to perform, was unrelated to Byer's business, was outside of the ordinary 
time and spatial bounds of his particular work on Lot 174, and was not done with the 
motive to further Byer's interests. See Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1057 
(Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court has upheld summary judgment in cases where, as 
here, an employee clearly acted in a way that was unauthorized, not part of his duties, and 
not motivated by accomplishment of his employer's interests. See Jackson v. Righter, 
891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995); Birkner, 111 P.2d 1053. 
A. Byer Cannot be held Vicariously Liable for Miles's Conduct Because, 
at the Time of the Accident, No Respondeat Superior Relationship 
Existed Between Byer and Miles. 
A respondeat superior relationship is determined by whether, at the time of the acts 
in question, the employer had the right to control the employee. Glover, 923 P.2d at 
1385. There was no respondeat superior relationship between Byer and Miles when 
Miles physically left the Byer worksite and became part of Lowell's operations for the 
project on Lot 173. Sutton must show that unloading Lowell's rebar was in furtherance 
of Byer's excavation business or that Byer retained control over Lowell's unloading 
operation. Kurtz v. Beneficial Temporaries, 921 P.2d 456, 461 (Utah 1996). The Kunz 
court found that, in a multiple-employer context, where one employer relinquishes control 
over the details of an employee's work, and where the employee's work does not benefit 
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that employer, there is no vicarious liability. Id. at 462. 
Byer could not be in control because it was not aware that Miles had left Byer's 
work on Lot 174 to join Lowell in its rebar unloading operation on Lot 173. (R. 585, 
591-92, 596, 747-748, 774, 791.) Bob Miles left Byer's work on Lot 174 and became 
part of Lowell's operation in unloading the rebar on Lot 173. (R. 791.) There is no 
evidence that Byer had any control over Lowell's operation or that it could direct Miles 
with respect to the details of that operation. 
Miles was under Lowell's control in unloading Lowell's rebar. Sutton admits 
Lowell was in charge of the unloading. (R. 814). Sutton's expert, Don Rigtrup, testified 
that Lowell was in charge of, in control of, and had the final say regarding, Lowell's rebar 
unloading operation. (R. 817-820). Lowell's superintendant confirms that Lowell "was 
in charge of the unloading operation" and that "Byer Excavating had absolutely no 
involvement with the Thorpe residence project on Lot 173." (R. 786-789). 
Further, Miles was not being paid by Byer for the time spent assisting Lowell with 
Lowell's project. Where Miles abandoned his responsibilities for Byer on Lot 174 and 
became part of Lowell's operation, there is no respondeat superior relationship and Byer 
cannot be held vicariously liable. Jackson, 891 P.2d at 1391. 
Although Byer had not authorized Miles to act on its behalf in assisting other 
contractors on unrelated projects, this case is analogous to those cases discussing the 
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"loaned employee" doctrine within the context of vicarious liability3. See Kurtz, 921 P.2d 
at 461. In that context, Byer Excavating cannot be liable for Bob Miles's acts because it 
did not have the right to "direct, supervise, and control the details of [Miles's] work," 
because that right belonged to Lowell, and because Miles's work for Lowell was not 
"performed in whole or in part in furtherance of [Byer's] business." Id at 462. There is 
no evidence that Byer had any right to control any aspect of Lowell Construction's 
operations on Lot 173, including the rebar unloading. There is no evidence that Lowell's 
rebar unloading furthered any business of Byer. 
Further, at the time of the accident, Miles was not doing Byer's work, or anything 
that furthered Byer's business. (R. 768.) Instead, he was working as "part of [Lowell's] 
operation." (R. 791.) Lowell had the right to control the details of Miles's work. Lowell 
decided where to position the rebar truck, and thus, where Miles needed to position his 
excavator. (R. 786). Lowell decided where the rebar should be unloaded. (R. 604.) 
Lowell provided the chain to connect the rebar to the trackhoe bucket. (R. 606, 776.) 
It was Lowell's responsibility to see that the rebar was unloaded. (R. 602.) The 
undisputed facts in the record clearly show that Lowell Construction was in charge of, in 
control of, and had the final say regarding Lowell's rebar unloading operation. Just as in 
3
 The focus in Kunz was not the agreement between the "primary employer" and the 
"special employer," but rather which employer retained control over the employee at the 
time of the accident. Simply because Miles agreed to leave his work and become part of 
Lowell's operation without consulting with Byer should not affect the result. Lowell 
Construction, not Byer Excavating, retained control over the details of Miles's work at 
the time of the accident. 
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Kunz, the details of Miles's work for Lowell were under Lowell's control, and Lowell 
had "primary supervisory responsibility" over Miles's acts while working for Lowell. 
Under the principles in Kunz, it is clear that Byer had no control over Miles when 
he became part of Lowell's unloading operation. The present case is militates more 
strongly against respondeat superior than in Kunz because Miles was not authorized to act 
on behalf of Byer in Lowell's operations as opposed to being a "loaned" as in Kunz. 
Thus, Byer Excavating had no respondeat superior relationship with Miles at the time of 
the accident. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Found that Bob Miles Was Acting Outside 
of the Course and Scope of his Employment for Byer Excavating when 
he Abandoned his Duties on Lot 174, and Went to Perform a Task he 
was Not Hired to Do for an Unrelated Contractor on Lot 173. 
A respondeat superior relationship between Byer Excavating and Bob Miles, by 
itself, is not sufficient to support Sutton's claim to hold Byer vicariously liable. Sutton 
must also show that Miles's conduct in stopping his work for Byer on Lot 174, leaving 
Byer's work-site, going to Lowell Construction's work-site and becoming part of 
Lowell's operation in unloading Lowell's rebar for Lowell's project on Lot 173 was 
within the course and scope of his employment with Byer. 
Both Sutton and Miles understood that Lowell's request for help in unloading 
Lowell's rebar for Lot 173 was outside the scope of what either of them were hired to do. 
Sutton acknowledged that Lowell's request to help unload its rebar on Lot 173 was 
outside the scope of work he was hired to do on Lot 174. (R. 810.) Bob Miles also 
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testified "I shouldn't be doing that because that's not what I'm paid to be doing" and 
"because I didn 't think that's where I should be. I should have been down there doing 
myjob forByer." (R. 800, 801.) 
Sutton must show that Miles's acts while assisting another contractor, Lowell 
Construction, on an unrelated project "are so closely connected with what the servant is 
employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as 
methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the 
employment."' Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994), quoting Birkner, 
111 P.2d at 1056. Sutton and Miles both knew that helping Lowell on Lot 173 was 
outside what they were hired to do by their respective employers and unrelated to any 
objective of their employers. The undisputed facts are that the activities relating to the 
accident on Lot 173 have no connection whatsoever with what Miles was employed to do 
for Byer or any conceivable objective of Byer. 
Utah courts look to three criteria articulated in Birkner v. Salt Lake County to 
determine whether an employee's acts fall within the course and scope of his 
employment. 771 P.2d at 1056-57. First, an employee's conduct must be of the general 
kind the employee is employed to perform, directed toward accomplishment of the 
objectives of the employees duties . Id. at 1056-57. This requires that the employee be 
"about the employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer." Id. Second, 
the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the 
ordinary spatial boundaries of employment. Id. at 1057. Third, the employee's conduct 
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must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. Id. 
Sutton must establish all these elements. The undisputed facts manifest that none 
of these required and essential elements of Sutton's claims are present in this case. 
L The Undisputed Facts of this Case Show that Miles was Hired to Perform 
Excavation and Grading Work on Lot 174, Not to Help Another 
Contractor Unload Rebar on a Separate and Unrelated Jobsite. 
Therefore, Miles9s Conduct While Assisting Lowell was Not of the 
General Kind He was Employed to Perform. 
The first factor is that the "employee must be about the employer's business and 
the duties assigned by the employer" Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127 (Utah 1994), and 
"directed toward the accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the employee's 
duties." Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1056-57. It is undisputed that Miles was about Lowell 
Construction's business, not Byer Excavating's, in unloading Lowell's rebar. Unloading 
Lowell Construction's rebar on Lot 173 was not directed to accomplish any objective of 
Miles's employment with Byer. Miles was assigned and employed to perform excavation 
work, not unload rebar for other contractors. 
Miles left Byer's work assignments on Lot 174 and became part of Lowell's 
operation unloading Lowell's rebar for Lowell's project on Lot 173. (R. 791.) Lowell's 
superintendant confirms "Byer Excavating had absolutely no involvement with the 
Thorpe residence project on Lot 173." (R. 786.) Jones did not even know who Byer was. 
(R. 786.) Unloading Lowell's rebar "did not benefit, in any way, Byer Excavating" and 
what Miles "was doing in assisting with unloading the rebar was purely for the benefit of 
Lowell Construction." (R. 787.) There is no dispute regarding Miles's testimony that he 
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knew he should not have left Byer's work to help Lowell because "Ishouldn't be doing 
that because that's not what I'm paid to be doing" and "because I didn 't think that's 
where I should be. I should have been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800, 
801.) 
In this case, Bob Miles's conduct was so clearly different from what he was hired 
to perform that, as the trial court properly concluded, he was not within the course and 
scope of his employment as a matter of law. Miles was employed by Byer to perform 
excavation and grading work pursuant to Byer's S310 Excavation and Grading license. 
(R. 775.) His job did not include using the trackhoe to unload equipment or materials. 
(R. 777.) On the day of the accident, Miles was assigned by Byer to clear trees, build a 
road on Lot 174, and dig a foundation on that lot. (R. 796-97.) Byer's business did not 
include concrete work or any work having to do with rebar. In fact, Byer does not have a 
concrete license which involves placement of rebar. (R. 775.) 
More important, Bob Miles was not hired or authorized to leave his work to help 
other contractors on unrelated projects. Miles was employed to perform work on projects 
Byer contracted to perform, not to assist any contractor on any project who may happen to 
ask for his help. Byer Excavating had absolutely no involvement with the home being 
built on Lot 173. (R. 767, 787.) It had not contracted with Lowell construction to 
perform any work on that lot, and its work on Lot 174 was completely unrelated to any 
work occurring on Lot 173. Id. In fact, Lowell's superintendent was completely unaware 
of who Byer Excavating was prior to this litigation. (R. 786.) Byer never authorized Bob 
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Miles to assist other contractors on other lots, and it was Byer's policy that its employees 
were not to use its equipment on jobsites other than those on which they were employed 
to work. (R. 766.) When Bob Miles left his work on Lot 174 to work for Lowell on Lot 
173, he did so without Byer's permission, and as Vic Byer put it, he "misappropriated 
Byer's trackhoe." (R. 766-67.) 
No reasonable juror could conclude that part of Bob Miles's job description was to 
accept invitations to go to different job sites and, using Byer's machinery, help other 
contractors with whatever needs they may have. Indeed, throughout his employment for 
Byer, and throughout his entire 30 year career, he had never been asked to leave his work 
to help another contractor on another jobsite. (R. 797.) He was hired to do Byer's 
excavation work on Lot 174, and when he left his work there to join Lowell's operation to 
unload its rebar on Lot 173, he was outside the course and scope of his employment. 
a. Miles's Scope of Employment is Determined by the Tasks and 
Objectives Assigned by Byer, not the Possible Uses of Equipment 
Used in Miles Employment. 
Sutton asks this Court take an expansive view of Bob Miles's job duties. 
Specifically, Sutton asks the Court to infer that because Bob Miles was a trackhoe 
operator, and Byer's trackhoe has the capability "to attach objects and lower them to the 
ground" that his job duties assigned by Byer necessarily included helping another 
contractor on an unrelated project unload rebar from a truck. There is no basis in fact or 
law for an inference that an employee's scope of employment must be equated to the full 
spectrum of capabilities of equipment used by that employee. The elements of 
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determining whether acts are within the course and scope of employment depend upon the 
tasks and objectives assigned by the employer, not the potential uses of equipment used 
by the employee. Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127; Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1056-57. 
The vast potential for absurd results under such a principal is obvious. On 
summary judgment, only reasonable inferences are allowed and the Court is not required 
to draw unreasonable inferences that are not supported by the facts. Surety Underwriters, 
2000 UT 71,137. 
b. Miles's Scope of Employment is Not Determined by What Other 
Byer Employees in Different Divisions ofByer's Business Were 
Employed to Perform. 
Sutton relies upon Miles's statement that he has unloaded rebar in the past. 
However, Bob Miles has never unloaded rebar as part of his employment with Byer. 
Byer does not use rebar as part of its business, particularly in the excavation and grading 
work Miles was hired to perform. (R. 583-84, 589-90, 595-96.) 
Sutton points to instances where other Byer employees on Byer utility projects 
allegedly moved or unloaded materials using a trackhoe. None of the alleged activities 
involved Bob Miles. The activities asserted by Sutton involved Byer's utility crews 
which perform different work and functions than the excavation and grading work Miles 
was employed to perform. Utility work crews include a machine operator and at least one 
or two other persons to assist with the pipe and utility work. The utility crews are 
equipped with rigging equipment for use in working with the pipes and utility materials. 
In contrast, Bob Miles typically worked alone and was not equipped with rigging 
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equipment because he was not hired to engage in any activity that would involve 
unloading pipe or other materials. (R. 583-84, 589-90, 595-96, 747-750, 758-58, 774-79.) 
a Miles Scope of Employment Did Not Include Taking Direction 
from Sutton to Assist other Contractors on Unrelated Projects. 
Sutton argues that Miles assisted Lowell because he was asked by Sutton as his 
"supervisor." However, Sutton argued before the trial court that "Mr. Miles unfounded 
perception" that Sutton was his supervisor on the project "is not relevant to the argument 
of whether he was in the course and scope of his employment with Byer." (R. 645.) 
While Sutton was hired to generally oversee work on Lot 174, Sutton recognized 
his involvement with Miles was limited to Miles's scope of work on Lot 174 and did not 
extend to Lot 173. (R. 809-10.) Byer was hired by M.H. AUred in a limited capacity—to 
provide earthwork, excavation, and grading work on Lot 174. (R. 766.) Sutton 
acknowledged that Lowell's request to help unload its rebar on Lot 173 was outside the 
scope of work he was hired to do on Lot 174. (R. 110.) 
d. Miles's Scope of Employment is Determined by Byer }s Assigned 
Tasks and Objectives, Not by any Alleged "Barter System" or 
Custom of "Doing Favors" for other Contractors. 
Sutton asserts the existence of an undefined "industry standard barter system" 
which expands all construction worker's scope of employment to include doing "favors" 
for other contractors on whatever unrelated projects may be in the vicinity of the 
employer's project. There are no facts that show that such a system was in place here 
because there was no agreement between Byer and Lowell, (R. 787) Jones never had any 
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conversations with anyone at Byer, (R. 786) and in fact, Jones did not even know who 
Byer was. (R. 786.) Miles had no authority to enter into agreements for Byer. (R. 747.) 
Again, the determinative elements of the scope of an employee's employment are 
governed by the employer's assigned tasks and objectives and do not include undefined 
trade customs or whatever casual practices other employers may follow. Christensen, 874 
P.2d at 127; Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1056-57. 
Sutton asserts that Miles acknowledged that contractors on projects help each other 
"from time to time." However, this statement was not in the context of his specific 
employment with Byer. (R. 88.) It also does not address the issue of Miles leaving his 
work on Lot 173 to assist Lowell Construction on the unrelated project of Lowell on Lot 
173 where Byer was not working. The undisputed material fact is that in his 30 or so 
years of experience in the excavation business, 17 of which was for Byer Excavating, Bob 
Miles had never been asked to leave his jobsite to help out on another jobsite. (R. 797-
798.) Byer Excavating gave its employees no authorization to do so. (R. 773.) 
Miles was not hired to perform "favors" for other contractors. Sutton's "custom" 
allegations do not give rise to an issue of fact. Byer is not bound by this amorphous and 
undefined "custom" and it has no bearing on Miles's scope of employment. Elmore v. 
Sullivan Advertising & Design, Inc. 2008 Texas App. LEXIS 7121 (2008) (reproduced in 
the Addendum)(Evidence of industry custom does not determine scope of employment). 
In Elmore, the court held that "It is unreasonable to assume that all.. .contracts are the 
same and that all.. .firms undertake the same responsibilities." Id. What other contractors 
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may do on other construction projects is immaterial. See Id.; Leger Construction, Inc. v. 
Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976)(Evidence of other projects requires identical 
circumstances); Busker v. Sokolowski, 203 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Iowa 1972)("Custom" on 
other construction projects inadmissible). 
In United States, etc. v. Guy H. James Construction Company, 390 F.Supp. 1193 
(M.D. Tenn. 1972), the Court held: 
Testimony of what is usually or generally done is not of the imperative, 
compulsory and universal character required to establish a custom. 
Existence of usage or custom can only be proved by numerous instances 
of actual practices, and not by opinion of a witness. A person seeking to 
establish custom or usage has the burden of proving it by evidence so 
clear, uncontradictory and distinct as to leave no doubt as to its nature 
and character. 
Id. at 1209 (Emphasis added). Further, such evidence must include numerous examples 
of "systematic or "semi-automatic conduct" in order to be admissible. Mere "tendency" 
to act in a given manner is not sufficient. G.M. Brod & Company, Inc. v. U.S. Home 
Corp., 759 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir. 1985); Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Systems, 
Inc., 847 F.2d 1290, 1293-1294 (7th Cir. 1988). There is no evidence to support the 
existence or parameters of any alleged "gratuitous bartering system" or that it has any 
bearing on the actual scope of Miles employment with Byer. 
Sutton relies upon deposition testimony of its expert, Don Rigtrup, for the 
proposition that sharing equipment and exchanging favors is commonplace on 
construction sites. However, Mr. Rigtrup testified that he is not familiar with the actual 
operations, custom, practice or experience of Byer Excavating. (R. 822-28.) 
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Accordingly, Rigtrup's "assumed facts which vary materially from the actual, undisputed 
facts" are insufficient to give rise to an issue of fact. Elmore, 2008 Texas App. LEXIS 
7121 (2008). 
Sutton's unsupported allegations of an "industry standard bartering system" and 
doing favors for contractors on unrelated projects is insufficient to give rise to an issue of 
fact. Sutton's argument creates the untenable and unworkable problem of defining the 
parameters and limits of the alleged custom of "gratuitous bartering" and "doing favors" 
within the construction industry. Sutton's theory would place undefined and potentially 
unlimited burdens and liability on contractors by effectively extinguishing the limits of 
their employee's scope of employment. Again, the undisputed fact is that Miles was not 
hired to do favors for other contractors on unrelated projects, was not authorized to do so, 
and had never been asked to do so in 30 years of work in the construction industry. 
2. The Accident Occurred Outside the Hours and Ordinary Spatial 
Boundaries of Bob Miles Js Employment. Therefore, Byer Excavating 
Cannot be Held Vicariously Liable for Bob Milesys Acts. 
The second factor which Sutton must establish is that at the time of the accident, 
Bob Miles was "substantially within the hours and ordinary spatial boundaries of the 
employment." Christens en, 874 P.2d at 127. In other words, Miles must have been 
acting "within the authorized limits of time and space" of his employment." Birkner, 111 
P.2d at 1056. When Miles became part of Lowell's operation of unloading Lowell's 
rebar on Lot 173, Miles was not within the hours of his employment for Byer or the 
ordinary spatial boundaries of his assigned tasks for Byer. 
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a. Miles was Not within the Hours of Employment for Byer. 
The time Bob Miles spent assisting Lowell unload rebar on Lot 173 was not within 
the hours of Miles's employment for Byer. Bob Miles knew that was not what he was to 
be paid for by Byer. (R. 801.) Bob Miles did not submit time to Byer for payment for the 
time he spent taking the trackhoe to Lot 173 to assist Lowell in unloading the rebar. (R. 
590-91, 595.) Byer did not pay Bob Miles for the time in taking the trackhoe to Lot 173 
and helping Lowell Construction unload the rebar. (R. 590-91, 595.) Therefore, because 
Miles was not on Byer's clock, he was not within the hours of his employment. 
b. Miles was Not Within the Area of His Work for Byer. 
Byer had no work to do at the location where the trackhoe was located during the 
rebar unloading and there was no reason for Bob Miles to be at that location in his 
employment for Byer. (R. 747-48, 774.) Any activities by Bob Miles on Lot 173 were 
outside the ordinary spatial boundaries of Bob Miles's employment with Byer. (R. 585, 
591-92,596.) 
Sutton alleges in its Complaint that the rebar was unloaded "to Lot #173." (R. 3-
4.) Sutton was injured on Lot 173. (R. 783.) Bob Miles left Byer's work on Lot 174 
and went to the physical location of Lowell's operation and became part of Lowell's 
operation in unloading the rebar onto Lot 173. (R. 791.) Sutton testified that this location 
was "up the hill from us, probably 50 to 100 yards..." from where Miles was working. 
(R. 805.) With respect to the location of Lowell's rebar unloading operation, Miles 
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testified that he did not want to go help Lowell there "because I didn H think that's 
where I should be. I should have been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800.) 
Sutton asserts that the fact that he asked Miles to help Lowell somehow transforms 
Lowell's project site into Byer's work on Lot 174. However, Sutton also acknowledged 
that Lowell's request to help unload its rebar on Lot 173 was outside the scope of work he 
was hired to do on Lot 174. (R. 810.) 
Sutton raises the issue of whether the tracks of the trackhoe actually left Lot 174.4 
Regardless of whether the track portion of the trackhoe was technically on Lot 174 or 
173, Sutton admits that the trackhoe was physically situated so the boom of the trackhoe 
could swing over Lot 173 and place the rebar on Lot 173. (R. 642-44, 783.) The 
undisputed material fact is that Byer had no work to do at the location where the trackhoe 
was located during the rebar unloading and there was no reason for Bob Miles to be at 
that location in his employment for Byer. (R. 747-48, 774.) 
Sutton relies upon the decision in Christens en, 874 P.2d at 127. However, that 
case is dramatically distinguishable from this case. In Christensen, a security employee at 
Geneva Steel was involved in an accident while traveling back from a brief, paid lunch 
break. The employer knew that employees regularly drove to a nearby cafe during the 
paid breaks. The court found that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the 
4
 In Christensen, the court found that simply inquiring whether the employee is on the 
employer's premises at the time of the incident is insufficient to determine whether the 
employee is within the ordinary spatial boundaries. Instead "[s]ome flexibility is required 
. . . ." M a t 128 n. 1. 
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employee was within the spatial boundaries of her employment because the employee was 
hired to "see and be seen" on and around Geneva Property, her employer tacitly 
sanctioned employees traveling from the guard post to obtain lunch from the cafe, and 
that she was in the geographic area accessible during her fifteen minute paid break. Id. 
By contrast, in this case Miles was not paid during the time assisting Lowell on 
Lot 173, Miles was not hired to "see and be seen" around Lot 173, Byer did not know that 
Miles left his work for Byer on Lot 174 to help Lowell on Lot 173, and there was no 
reason for Miles to be at the location where the rebar was unloaded. Accordingly, Miles 
was not within the spatial boundaries of his employment for Byer. 
3. Bob Miles's Conduct when he Left His Work on Lot 174 to help Lowell 
Construction with its Project was not Motivated by the Purpose of Serving 
Byer's Interests, and in Fact Did Not Serve Byer's Interests. 
Finally, for an employee to be within the course and scope of his employment, his 
conduct "must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's 
interests." Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127 quotingBirkner, 111 P.2d at 1057. There is no 
evidence that Miles was motivated to unload Lowell's rebar on Lot 173 by any interest of 
Byer. Again, Bob Miles testified "I shouldn't be doing that because that's not what I'm 
paid to be doing" and "because I didn 't think that's where I should be. I should have 
been down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800-01.) Accordingly, he did not submit 
any time to Byer for payment for the time spent assisting Lowell unload its rebar on Lot 
173. 
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Sutton offers no evidence, and there is no evidence, that Miles's motivation to 
assist Lowell on an unrelated project was to serve any interest of Byer. "Specific facts are 
required to show whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Reagan Outdoor Advertising 
v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). There are no facts indicating Miles was 
motivated to serve any interest of Byer. 
Sutton speculates that Byer benefitted from an undefined "gratuitous barter system 
common on construction projects by having the use of Lot 173's port-a-potty for its 
employees working on Lot 174." Sutton Brief, p. 9. There is no evidence that Miles was 
motivated by the existence of the port-a-potty on Lot 173. In fact, Miles and Byer were 
unaware of the existence of the port-a-potty. (R. 755, 780.) 
Sutton also asserts that Miles was motivated by an interest to appear to be "a team 
player" to the benefit of Byer. This is not a reasonable inference because Lowell was not 
aware of who Byer was or its existence until well after the incident when this lawsuit was 
filed. (R. 786.) Miles simply decided to help someone who asked for help. Miles said 
he acted simply because "you know, the guy [Lowell's superintendent, Don Jones] needs 
some help, I guess I'll go help him." (R. 760.) Miles stated that he could not imagine any 
interest of Byer that was served by unloading Lowell Construction's rebar. (R. 590.) At 
the same time, it is clear that Miles knew that that was not what he should be doing in his 
employment for Byer. 
To be within the course and scope of employment, an employee's conduct must be 
motivated by the purpose of serving the employer. See Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127. 
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Sutton appears to argue that any conduct meets this standard so long as it is not "highly 
unusual, and quite outrageous." Sutton Brief, p. 16. However, this is not the standard set 
forth in Birkner, Christensen, or any other Utah decision. Sutton relies upon Christensen 
where the court considered that the paid breaks benefitted the employer's interest of 
speed and efficiency and more satisfied, productive employees. Id. No such interest of 
Byer was served by the unloading of Lowell's rebar. 
Miles stated in his affidavit that he could not imagine any interest of Byer that was 
served by unloading Lowell Construction's rebar. (R. 590.) He admitted in his 
deposition that he knew he should not have been helping Lowell, but "should have been 
down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800.) He recognized that his work for Lowell 
did not benefit Byer, so he did not submit time for that work. (R. 595.) He further 
confirms that he was not motivated by serving Byer's interests when he went to help 
Lowell. (R.743.) 
II. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO FACTS TO SUGGEST THAT BYER 
EXCAVATING ACTED TO VEST BOB MILES WITH APPARENT 
AUTHORITY. THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY 
LIABLE ON THIS THEORY. 
Sutton also claims Miles had apparent authority to agree on behalf of Byer 
to assist Lowell. Sutton claims he "presumed" that Miles had such authority 
because he had possession of Byer's trackhoe. This is not sufficient to give rise to 
an issue of fact. 
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In Jackson, 891 P.2d at 1392, the court held: 
To be vicariously liable for the acts of an employee under a 
theory of apparent authority, an employer must conduct itself 
in such a way as to clothe its employee with apparent 
authority to perform the torts committed and there must be 
reasonable reliance on that apparent authority on the part of 
the injured party. 
There is no evidence of any conduct on the part of Byer to indicate that Miles was 
authorized to leave his work for Byer on Lot 174 and join Lowell's operation of 
unloading rebar on Lot 173. Byer had nothing to do with the project on Lot 173. There is 
no evidence suggesting that Miles was authorized to represent or act on behalf of Byer 
with respect to any activity with Lowell's rebar unloading on Lot 173. There is also no 
evidence of any reasonably reliance by Sutton on any conduct of Byer which could 
conceivably clothe Miles with such authority. 
Even managerial status, which Miles did not have, does not entitle a third person to 
assume a managerial employee is authorized to engage in all activities on behalf of the 
employer. Jackson, 891 P.2d at 1392. The Utah Supreme Court has held that even use 
of the employer's name in the course of business does not give rise to apparent authority. 
Bodell Constr. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 945 P.2d 119 (Utah App. 1997). 
Apparent authority must be based upon the conduct of the alleged principal, Byer, 
and not on the conduct of Miles or Sutton's subjective presumptions. Zions First Nat. 
Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Utah 1988). In City Elec. v. Dean 
Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983), the Court held: 
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It is well settled law that the apparent or ostensible authority of an 
agent can be inferred only from the acts and conduct of the principal. 
Where corporate liability is sought for acts of its agent under 
apparent authority, liability is premised upon the corporations 
knowledge of and acquiescence in the conduct of its agent which has 
led third parties to rely upon the agent's actions. Nor is the authority 
of the agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to the person with 
whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause third parties to 
believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority.... It follows 
that one who deals exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to 
ascertain that agent's authority despite the agent's representations. 
Id. at 90 (Emphasis added). Sutton has offered no evidence of Byer's conduct to support 
its apparent authority to use Byer's equipment to perform other contractors' work on 
other projects. It is not enough that Sutton "presumed" Miles had authority. It is 
undisputed that Miles acted without Byer's knowledge. There is no evidence that Sutton 
took any action to ascertain the scope of Miles's authority. 
In this case, Appellant bases his claim of apparent authority entirely on the conduct 
of Bob Miles, and upon his own presumptions. There are no facts to indicate that Byer 
acted in any way to clothe Miles with apparent authority. Instead, the record shows that 
Bob Miles was not authorized by Byer to use its trackhoe in the way that he did, and that 
Bob Miles did so without the knowledge of Byer. (R. 766, 744.) 
Again, Miles testified "Ishouldn't be doing that because that's not what I'm 
paid to be doing" and "J didn 't think that's where I should be. I should have been 
down there doing my job for Byer." (R. 800). There are simply no facts to support a 
case of apparent authority, and the trial court was correct to dismiss Sutton's claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Byer Excavating, Inc. requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and fmd that Byer Excavating cannot 
be held vicariously liable for the actions of Bob Miles. 
DATED this 3 ? day of April, 2011. 
STRONG & HANNI 
EEraL, 
Stanford F. Fitts 
Michael L. Ford 
S. Spencer Brown 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Elmore v. Sullivan Advertising & Design, Inc. 2008 Texas App. LEXIS 7121 (2008) 
(Produced pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1)(B)) 
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LexisNexis* 
LEXSEE 2008 TEXAS APP. LEXIS 7121 
JACQUELYN ELMORE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF 
THE ESTATE OF RON ELMORE, DECEASED, AND INTERVENOR, RONNIE 
ELMORE, Appellants v. E. SULLIVAN ADVERTISING & DESIGN, INC., 
Appellee 
No. 11-07-00118-CV 
COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, ELEVENTH DISTRICT, EASTLAND 
2008 Tex, App. LEXIS 7121 
September 25, 2008, Decided 
September 25, 2008, Opinion Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for review filed 
by, 12/16/2008 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] 
On Appeal from the 172nd District Court, Jefferson 
County, Texas. Trial Court Cause No. E-171,096. 
JUDGES: Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., McCali, J., 
and Strange, J. 
OPINION BY: TERRY McCALL 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Jacquelyn and Ronnie Elmore, the parents of Ron 
Elmore, filed a wrongful death action against Heath 
Charming Hebert and his employer, E. Sullivan 
Advertising & Design, Inc. Hebert and his family were 
on their way to a Labor Day Music Festival in Beaumont 
when Hebert missed a turn. Hebert was in the process of 
making a U-turn when Ron Elmore's motorcycle struck 
Hebert's Toyota Sequoia. Ron subsequently died from his 
injuries. The trial court granted E. Sullivan Advertising's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Hebert 
was not acting within the course and scope of his 
employment when the collision occurred. ] We affirm. 
1 In addition to Heath Hebert and his wife, 
Aspen Hebert, and E. Sullivan Advertising, the 
Elmores also sued a number of other defendants. 
The trial court granted summary judgments for all 
of the defendants except the Heberts. The court 
severed the claims against E. Sullivan 
Advertising, and the Elmores filed this appeal 
from that final judgment. 
Background Facts 
E. Sullivan Advertising [*2] was a Beaumont 
advertising agency that had been hired by Perfect Day 
Enterprises to handle the media advertising for the Labor 
Day Music Festival. Eric Sullivan, the president and 
owner of E. Sullivan, testified that he had personally 
pursued the account by contacting Angela Baker of 
Perfect Day Enterprises. 
Hebert testified that he was the business manager for 
E. Sullivan Advertising and that it was his job to run the 
office, oversee internal employees, and handle the 
finances and the books. His responsibilities did not 
involve selling advertising or the production and design 
aspects of the business. It was not part of his job to obtain 
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clients or discuss with clients of E. Sullivan Advertising 
whether they were happy with the firm's work. Hebert 
was authorized to sign certain types of contracts on 
behalf of E. Sullivan Advertising, and he did sign a 
contract to design laminated backstage passes for the 
festival. 
Eric Sullivan testified that he was Hebert's 
supervisor, that Hebert was off work on that Labor Day, 
and that Hebert was not under the supervision of anyone 
at E. Sullivan Advertising on that Labor Day. Eric 
Sullivan said that he had not directed any of his 
employees, including [*3] Hebert, to go to the concert. 
As it turned out, the other two employees of the firm, 
Tish Kimball and Kari Riley, also went to the concert. 
Sullivan went to the concert by himself to hear the 
musical group "Bad Company," and his wife was to join 
him later when the singer Tracy Byrd performed. 
Hebert testified that he was driving his own Toyota 
Sequoia when the accident occurred. Hebert was taking 
his wife and daughter to attend the Tracy Byrd concert 
and Labor Day festival at Ford Park. Hebert said it was 
his own idea to go to the concert and festival. Although 
he knew that Eric Sullivan planned to go to the festival, 
he had no plans to meet Eric there. Hebert stated that he 
bought his own tickets during a lunch break a week 
before the accident. Hebert explained that E. Sullivan 
Advertising placed the media for the event, but when the 
festival started on Labor Day, the firm's work had been 
completed. The firm did not have any business or 
anything to do with the event itself. 
Standard of Review 
A movant for a traditional summary judgment has 
the burden to show that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); [*4] City of 
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 
678 (Tex. 1979). An appellate court reviewing a summary 
judgment must consider all the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable 
inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolving any 
doubts against the movant. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Mayes, 236 S.WJd 754 (Tex. 2007). Evidence that 
favors the movant's position will not be considered unless 
it is uncontroverted. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San 
Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 
1965). 
Plaintiffs who rely on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior to hold an employer liable have the burden of 
proving at trial that the employee was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment at the time of the 
accident. Dunlap-Tarrant v. Ass'n Cas. Ins. Co., 213 
S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.); Soto v. 
Seven Seventeen HBE Corp., 52 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [Nth DistJ 2000, no pet.); Mata v. 
Andrews Transp., Inc., 900 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [Nth DistJ 1995, no writ). However, a 
defendant moving for a traditional summary judgment 
has the burden of establishing that, as a matter of law, 
[*5] the plaintiff has no cause of action against the 
defendant. The defendant may carry that burden by 
conclusively negating one of the elements of plaintiffs 
cause of action or by establishing all elements of an 
affirmative defense to each claim. Am. Tobacco Co. v. 
Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). Once the 
defendant movant presents evidence to establish his or 
her right to a summary judgment, the nonmovant must 
come forward with evidence or law that precludes 
summary judgment. City of Houston, 589 S.W.2d at 
678-79; Seelin Med, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., 203 S.W.3d 
867, 869 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, pet denied). 
Because E. Sullivan Advertising moved for a 
traditional summary judgment, it had the initial burden to 
establish that Hebert was not acting within the course and 
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 
Doctrine of Respondeat Superior 
The essential elements of a negligence cause of 
action are (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another, 
(2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately 
caused by the breach. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. 
Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990); Ginther v. 
Domino's Pizza, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [Nth DistJ 2002, pet. denied). [*6] The 
existence of a legal duty is the threshold requirement. 
Generally, a person has no duty to control the 
conduct of another. Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 
S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983). Under the theory of 
respondeat superior, however, an employer may be 
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employee if 
the employee's actions are within the course and scope of 
his employment. Mayes, 236 S. W.3d at 756. An employer 
is liable for the tort of its employee only when the 
tortious act falls within the scope of the employee's 
general authority in furtherance of the employer's 
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business and for the accomplishment of the object for 
which the employee was hired. Id.; Minyard Food Stores, 
Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002). Thus, 
the employee's act (1) must be committed within the 
scope of the general authority of the employee (2) in 
furtherance of the employer's business and (3) for the 
accomplishment of the object or purpose for which the 
employee was hired. Leadon v. Kimbrough Bros. Lumber 
Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1972); Robertson Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 
1971)] Bell v. VPSI, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 706, 715 (Tex. 
App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). 
E. [*7] Sullivan Advertising moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that its evidence negated the 
duty and breach of duty elements essential to the 
Elmores' claims. In their depositions, Hebert and Eric 
Sullivan testified to facts that demonstrated that Hebert 
was not acting within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the collision. The trial court 
granted E. Sullivan Advertising's motion. 
The Elmores raise two issues on appeal. First, they 
argue that the trial court erred when it struck the affidavit 
testimony of their expert, Holly DeLaune, that the 
Elmores relied on to show that Hebert was acting in the 
course and scope of his employment. Second, they argue 
that the trial court erred in granting the motion for 
summary judgment because E. Sullivan Advertising 
failed to conclusively prove that Hebert was not acting 
within the course and scope of his employment at the 
time of the collision and that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Hebert was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment at that time. 
Analysis 
E. Sullivan Advertising's summary judgment 
evidence showed that; it was closed for business on that 
Labor Day; that Hebert was off work and [*8] did not 
have the authority to conduct any business for E. Sullivan 
Advertising that day; that Hebert's boss, Eric Sullivan, 
did not direct or request Hebert to go to the concert or do 
anything on behalf of the firm on that day; that Hebert's 
responsibilities with the firm did not include working 
with clients on their events; that Hebert decided on his 
own to take his family to the concert and festival; and 
that Hebert was driving his own car at the time of the 
accident. The evidence showed that Hebert's actions that 
day were not within his general authority, were not in 
furtherance of his employer's business, and were not 
made for the accomplishment of the object or purpose for 
which he was hired. Therefore, E. Sullivan Advertising 
established its right to a standard summary judgment by 
conclusively negating the duty element of the Elmores' 
cause of action against it. 
The burden then shifted to the Elmores to come 
forward with evidence or law that would preclude 
summary judgment for E. Sullivan Advertising. The 
Elmores attempted to introduce the affidavit of DeLaune, 
an advertising executive and partner with the firm of 
Erickson USA LP. DeLaune stated that she had reviewed 
the depositions [*9] of Eric Sullivan, Hebert, and "the 
exhibits relating to the promotion of the Labor Day 
Festival at Ford Park." She then concluded: 
Based on industry standards and 
practices with which I am familiar and 
have used in my work, it would be 
imperative for Sullivan Advertising to 
have persons present who could act on 
behalf of Sullivan Advertising at the Labor 
Day Festival to ensure things run 
smoothly and vendors and customers 
would be satisfied. 
We have reviewed the portions of those depositions and 
exhibits that were introduced as summary judgment 
evidence. The facts set forth in the uncontroverted 
testimony of Hebert and Eric Sullivan do not support 
DeLaune's conclusions. 
The Elmores state that DeLaune "was hired to review 
the issues and events of this case . . . to determine 
whether or not, based on industry custom and practice, 
Heath Hebert was in the course and scope of his 
employment." Despite the testimony of Hebert and Eric 
Sullivan that Hebert was off work that day, that Hebert 
was not directed or requested to attend the concert and 
festival, and that Hebert's employee responsibilities did 
not involve working with the firm's clients, DeLaune 
concluded that Hebert must have been going [*10] to the 
festival to "facilitate or accomplish the smooth running of 
the event, troubleshoot client concern and promot[e] . . . 
client retention." That conclusion is not a reasonable 
inference from the facts testified to by Hebert and Eric 
Sullivan. The only basis for DeLaune's conclusion was 
her assumption that she would have attended the event 
for those purposes; therefore, Hebert must have done so. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7121, * 10 
Page 4 
When an expert's opinion is based on assumed facts 
that vary materially from the actual, undisputed facts, the 
opinion is without probative value. Burroughs Wellcome 
Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995). DeLaune 
stated that her conclusions concerning Hebert's duties 
were based on her knowledge of the media industry and 
her actual work of promoting events. DeLaune did not 
provide a reasonable basis for such an assumption 
concerning industry custom and practice. It is 
unreasonable to assume that all media contracts are the 
same and that all media firms undertake the same 
responsibilities. DeLaune did not show how E. Sullivan 
Advertising's media contract with Perfect Day 
Enterprises required E. Sullivan Advertising to have 
personnel there on Labor Day "to troubleshoot," promote 
the [*11] concert, or work with vendors. DeLaune stated 
that Hebert was attending "a Labor Day Festival that was 
being promoted solely by his employer, Sullivan 
Advertising." The uncontroverted testimony was that 
Perfect Day Enterprises was the promoter of the festival 
and ran the event; E. Sullivan Advertising's role was to 
place the media, and its work had been completed when 
the event began. 
The Elmores rely on Allbritton v. Gillespie, Rozen, 
Tanner & Watsky, P.C, 180 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied), a legal malpractice case. 
However, the expert in Allbritton based his conclusion on 
underlying facts. Allbritton and a fellow employee had 
sued their employer for breach of contract. The jury 
found that the employer had breached the contract but 
awarded no damages to Allbritton despite awarding $ 
4,000,000 to the other employee. In the subsequent legal 
malpractice suit, Allbritton's expert concluded that the 
former attorneys should have hired an expert witness to 
both calculate and testify as to Allbritton's damages. The 
expert explained the basis for his opinion, pointing out 
such facts as Allbritton not having the background or 
education to calculate his damages and having tried 
[*12] to use a methodology to calculate damages that was 
not correct. In contrast, DeLaune's conclusory opinions 
were not supported by underlying facts. The trial court 
did not err in excluding her affidavit. 
The Elmores attempt to create a fact issue on course 
and scope of employment by pointing out that Hebert was 
the business agent and could sign contracts on behalf of 
E. Sullivan Advertising. The Elmores' burden was to 
show that Hebert was acting within the course and scope 
of employment at the time of the accident. Bell, 205 
S.W.3d at 715. Stated another way, the Elmores had to 
show that E. Sullivan Advertising had the right of control 
over Hebert's physical movements at the time of the 
accident. Brown v. Am. Racing Equip., Inc., 933 S.W.2d 
734, 735 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ)', 
Graham v. McCord, 384 S.W.2d 897, 898-99 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—San Antonio 1964, no writ). Hebert's status as 
business manager and his authority to sign contracts were 
not sufficient evidence to raise a fact question on whether 
Hebert was acting within the course and scope of 
employment at that time. 
The Elmores also argue that the question of whether 
an employee is acting within the course and scope of his 
[*13] employment is usually a question of fact. We agree. 
However, there needed to be some testimony of facts that 
contradicted the facts as related by Hebert and Eric 
Sullivan, Although the Elmores attempt to draw an 
analogy between this case and this court's opinion in 
Sw.-Tex. Leasing Co. v. Denise, No. 11-99-00127-CV, 
2000 WL 34235126 (Tex. App.-Eastland Aug. 3, 2000, 
no pet.) (not designated for publication), Denise 
demonstrates what was missing from the Elmores' 
summary judgment proof. 
Denise involved conflicting testimony as to the 
underlying facts; this case does not have such conflicting 
testimony. The trial court had granted Raylin Ann Denise 
a partial summary judgment that Donnie Taylor was, as a 
matter of law, in the course and scope of his employment 
with Advantage Rent-A-Car at the time of Taylor's 
collision with Denise. Denise's summary judgment 
evidence included an affidavit by Taylor that stated that 
he had heard that the Advantage vehicle he was driving at 
the time of the accident had brake problems, that he was 
test driving it to see if there were in fact brake problems, 
and that that was part of his job. Advantage attached an 
affidavit sworn to by Donald Livesay, the [*14] manager 
of the Advantage location where Taylor worked, to its 
response to Denise's motion for summary judgment. 
Livesay stated that Taylor was a service agent, that 
service agents were not authorized to test drive vehicles 
unless specifically instructed to do so, and that Taylor 
had not been instructed to test drive the vehicle. Livesay 
also stated that no complaints had been made concerning 
any problem with the vehicle. Advantage also attached an 
affidavit sworn to by the customer who had rented and 
returned the vehicle just prior to the accident; he stated 
that he had no problems with the brakes. Thus, the 
summary judgment evidence in Denise contained 
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conflicting testimony as to the critical facts, and this court 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
In the case before us now, there was no testimony 
contradicting the facts as related by Hebert and Eric 
Sullivan. Even though they were interested witnesses, 
their testimony was clear, positive, direct, otherwise 
credible, and free from contradictions and consistencies 
and could have been readily controverted. See Trico 
Techs. Corp. v. Montiel, 949 S.W.ld 308, 310 (Tex. 
1997). The Elmores could have effectively countered 
their testimony [*15] by opposing evidence if any 
existed. The Elmores did not attempt to controvert then-
testimony through additional deposition testimony, 
interrogatories, or other discovery. The depositions of 
Hebert and Eric Sullivan were competent summary 
judgment evidence. 
The Elmores attempt to discredit their testimony by 
pointing out that Hebert and Eric Sullivan were 
brothers-in-law. That fact does not controvert their 
testimony or mean that they were not truthful in their 
testimony. The Elmores also make a point that Eric 
Sullivan's children did not have tickets to the festival 
even though Eric testified that he had purchased tickets. 
Hebert also testified that he had purchased tickets to the 
festival. Whether the Sullivan children had free tickets to 
the festival is not evidence that is relevant to a 
determination of whether Hebert was within the course 
and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 
Both of the Elmores' issues are overruled. 
This Court's Ruling 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
TERRY McC ALL 
JUSTICE 
September 25, 2008 
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